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KIERKEGAARD ON RATIONALITY 
Marilyn Gaye Piety 
This paper is concerned with Kierkegaard's views on the nature of human 
rationality in the specific context of the relation between competing interpre-
tations of existence. Contemporary dialogue has reached the point where it 
appears movement between such interpretations can only be understood as 
rational, if it is seen as a natural or evolutionary development and not as the 
result of a choice. This paper provides a sketch of a theory of rationality 
which enables us to make sense of the impression that we do, at least occa-
sionally, choose between competing interpretations of existence and that we 
make such choices for what we believe are good, or even compelling reasons. 
The idea has been advanced that human behavior, or more specifically, 
choice, can only be understood as rational within a particular conceptual 
framework. Proponents of this view contend that any possible system of 
justification must be understood as relative to a particular framework or 
system of values and hence that it is not possible to make rational choices 
between frameworks. Charles Taylor argues, on the other hand, that move-
ment between frameworks can be rational. He bases this argument, however, 
on the claim that such movement is a natural or evolutionary development 
and not the result of a choice. I The contemporary debate on this issue has 
reached the point where it appears we must consider either that it is not 
possible to choose rationally between frameworks, or that there is rational 
movement between frameworks, but that this movement is not the result of 
a choice. 
Taylor contends that the transition from one framework to another is ef-
fected through what he refers to as "error reducing moves."2 That is, he asserts 
that insofar as a given framework may involve certain incoherences, and 
insofar as an individual may be motivated to reduce these incoherences, his 
effort to do this may actually eventuate in the production of, or transition to, 
a new framework. He asserts that the situation of Luther with respect to 
traditional catholicism could be understood as exemplifying a movement of 
this sort. 
Taylor argues, however, that such a transition from one framework to an-
other is not the result of an appeal to some criterion that is independent of 
the two frameworks in question, but rather that it is the natural result of the 
desire of the individual for a more coherent scheme for interpreting his 
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existence. Taylor does not see the individual as choosing between competing 
systems of interpretation, but rather as developing new systems through an 
effort to reduce the incoherences or errors inherent in the old systems. 
Thus, while many theorists are disposed to see the movement from one 
framework to another as fundamentally irrational, Taylor sees it as rational. 
Taylor is in agreement with the former group, however, in that he is not 
willing to allow that there are any criteria independent of the two frameworks 
in question, such that an appeal to these criteria would justify, or show to be 
rational, the choice of one over another. 
It would appear that the impasse at which the contemporary debate on the 
nature of human rationality has arrived is the result of the tendency of philoso-
phers, despite their efforts to the contrary, to cling to the old Enlightenment view 
of disinterested and dispassionate reasoning as the paradigm of that rationality. 
I shall argue that Kierkegaard provides us with a picture of an interested and 
impassioned reason which enables us to see how it is possible for the transition 
from one framework to another to be both rational and the result of a choice and 
that insofar as it does this, it represents a more "reasonable" picture of reason 
than the one that has been traditionally offered by metaphysics. 
I 
The view that choice can only be understood as rational relative to a particular 
conceptual framework is precisely the one that provides the foundation for 
Alasdair MacIntyre's charge in After Virtue) that Kierkegaard considers moral 
commitment to be "the expression of a criterionless choice,"4 or a choice 
between "incompatible and incommensurable moral premises, a choice for 
which no rational justification can be given." MacIntyre refers to this position 
as Kierkegaard's "discovery" and identifies it as his primary contribution to 
the history of moral or ethical philosophy; a contribution which MacIntyre 
claims marks the beginning of the "distinctively modern standpoint" on the 
nature of moral debate. MacIntyre is undoubtedly correct in his identification 
of the distinctively modern standpoint on such debates. He is not correct, 
however, as will become clear in the pages which follow, in his ascription of 
this view to Kierkegaard. 
Kierkegaard's frameworks may be designated 'aesthetic,' 'ethical,' 'relig-
ious' and 'paradoxically religious' or 'Christian.'5 That is, Kierkegaard's in-
dividual views existence from within one or the other of these alternative 
schemes of interpretation. The aesthetic individual, for example, views ex-
istence as defined aesthetically. He interprets the value of the phenomena of 
his existence-including his own actions-as derivative of, or reducible to, 
their aesthetic significance. Thus an aesthete values actions not insofar as 
they exemplify morally uplifting principles, but rather insofar as they are 
immediately compelling, interesting, or sensuously gratifying. 
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The difficulty, as Macintyre so forcefully pointed out, is that different 
frameworks represent significantly different systems of values, hence what 
may serve as a criterion for choice within an ethical framework will very 
likely not enjoy the same status within an aesthetic framework. 6 The moral 
superiority of an ethical over an aesthetic interpretation of existence cannot 
serve, for an aesthete, as a criterion for choosing it over his present interpre-
tation, because such "superiority" is not considered by an aesthete to be of 
any positive value. This situation is, of course, mirrored by that of the ethicist; 
hence one might conclude from this, as indeed Macintyre does conclude, that 
such a choice between frameworks as Kierkegaard has B recommending to 
A in Either-Or, cannot be a rational one. 
Macintyre focuses upon the transition from an aesthetic to an ethical view 
of existence. It is clear, however, from Kierkegaard's own description of this 
transition, that Macintyre has not properly understood Kierkegaard's posi-
tion. The aesthetic stage of existence is also referred to by Kierkegaard as 
the stage of immediacy. To be an aesthete, for Kierkegaard, means to have 
an understanding of existence which interprets it in terms of what appears, 
in an immediate sense, to be true about it. Such an individual has his con-
sciousness, according to Kierkegaard-and in particular his consciousness of 
suffering-in the dialectic of fortune and misfortune. 7 Thus Kierkegaard ar-
gues that misfortune or suffering is, for this individual, 
like a narrow pass on the way; now the immediate individual is in it, but his 
view of life must essentially always tell him that the difficulty will soon cease 
to hinder because it is a foreign element. If it does not cease, he despairs, by 
which his immediacy ceases to function, and the transition to another under-
standing of existence is rendered possible. 8 
What happens to the aesthete is that, in his despair, it seems to him as if 
there is a discrepancy between his suffering-insofar as it is persistent-and 
the interpretation of existence in which suffering is viewed as having merely 
accidental significance. Thus the aesthete, using the persistence of his suffer-
ing as a criterion for choosing between a view of existence in which suffering 
is considered merely accidental and a view in which it is seen as essential, 
may reject the aesthetic interpretation in favor of an ethical one. Such an 
individual adopts an ethical framework, not because it promises to alleviate 
his suffering, but because it provides an interpretation of his existence which 
sees suffering as something essential to that existence, and thus provides a 
more adequate-or one might even say more rational-account of his sub-
jective experience. 
It may be that there are other criteria, or other aspects of subjective expe-
rience apart from suffering, that could serve as criteria for choosing between 
competing interpretations of existence on Kierkegaard's view. Suffering is, 
however, the criterion which Kierkegaard himself chooses to focus upon 
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when examining the nature of the transition from one stage of existence to 
another in the Postscript9 and it will become apparent, in the pages which 
follow, that this criterion alone is enough to expose the erroneous nature of 
MacIntyre's interpretation of Kierkegaard and his subsequent charge that 
Kierkegaard was an irrationalist. 
II 
Insofar as one framework or interpretation of existence may be spoken of as 
more adequate than another-that is, insofar as it may be spoken of as pro-
viding a more satisfactory account of the nature of the subjective experience 
of a particular individual-it is entirely reasonable to consider that it is more 
rational. 1o What is likely less clear, however, is precisely how the individual 
comes to consider that one interpretation is more adequate than another. In 
this instance we are concerned specifically with how it is that the individual 
comes to consider that the persistence of suffering is too great for the aesthetic 
interpretation of existence to be plausible, for it appears that it would be 
entirely possible for an individual to persist in suffering while simultaneously 
persisting in the belief that the suffering was indeed accidental and that in 
the next moment, with a change of fortune, it would stop. 
Objectively, there is no incoherence in the idea that an aesthetic individual 
may experience persistent suffering. The accidental may indeed be persistent. 
The aesthetic interpretation of existence is not contradicted by the occurrence 
of what is, within this framework, the improbable persistence of suffering. 
Such statements of probability or improbability as a given framework ex-
presses 
cannot be strictly contradicted by any event [e.g., the persistence of suffering] 
however improbably this event may appear in its light. The contradiction 
must be established by a personal [my italics] act of appraisal. ll 
The question is: Whence arises this "personal act of appraisal"; or when and 
how does the individual come to consider the persistence of his suffering to 
be too great and hence too improbable, within the aesthetic framework, for 
that interpretation of existence to be correct? 
It is at this point that Kierkegaard's views concerning the role of passion 
in human reason come into play. It is widely recognized by Kierkegaard 
scholars that, as Heinrich Schmidinger expresses it: "Subjektives Engagement 
ist ... immer mit Leidenschaft und Pathos verbunden."12 It has also been ob-
served, however, that Kierkegaard considers passion to be opposed to reflec-
tion,13 hence it is often believed that subjective engagement, according to 
Kierkegaard, is purely emotional, or devoid of any intellectual component. 
This view is the result of a failure to appreciate that the intellectual dimen-
sion of human experience is not reducible, for Kierkegaard, to reflection. 
Reflection is indeed dispassionate or disinterested, according to Kierkegaard. 14 
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He also speaks of "abstract" or "systematic" thought as disinterested. IS This 
would appear, however, to be a rather abbreviated or short hand way of 
emphasizing that the object of such thought is not the self, for he states 
elsewhere that all knowledge "is interested,"'6 whether the object of interest 
is something outside the knower, as is the case in metaphysics, or whether it 
is the knower himself, as is the case in ethics and religion. 
Kierkegaard often equates passion and interest. 17 It is thus reasonable to 
assume that, if knowledge is interested, then it is also passionate, or involves 
passion at some level. But if knowledge involves passion, then it would 
appear that passion is not essentially opposed to reason, but rather plays an 
important part in the activity of the knower as such. If this is the case, then 
the passionate nature of subjective engagement does not preclude the possi-
bility that such engagement could be rational. Hence the "personal act of 
appraisal" in question is not a merely arbitrary, capricious or emotional re-
action to a phenomenon or particular set of phenomena; it is the result of a 
rational assessment of this phenomenon, or these phenomena, where the 
reason in question is of a passionate or interested sort. 
The difficulty is that very few scholars appreciate the way in which passion 
informs reason, on Kierkegaard's view. In order to throw some light on this 
issue I shall depart for a moment from the examination of Kierkegaard's texts 
and turn instead to the consideration of the views of a more contemporary 
philosopher on this same issue. Michael Polanyi, whose views on probability 
I quoted above, is concerned in his book Personal Knowledge with how it is 
that apparently objectively meaningless probability statements become sub-
jectively meaningful guides for interpreting reality.'8 Polanyi maintains that 
there is an area of extremely low probability-i.e., what we would refer to 
in everyday speech as an area of high improbability-that we find generally 
unacceptable. The occurrence of an event that is associated with this level of 
improbability leads us, he argues, to reject the interpretation of existence 
within which this event is considered so improbable and to search for a new 
interpretation where events such as the one in question are considered more 
probable. Polanyi goes on to point out, however, that any attempt toformalize 
the precise degree of improbability that we find unacceptable and which, 
when connected to a particular phenomenon within a given theory or inter-
pretation of existence, would lead us to reject that view as false "is likely to 
go too far unless it acknowledges in advance that it [i.e., the formalization] 
must remain within a framework of personal [i.e., impassioned subjective] 
judgement."'9 
The metaphysical tradition has led us to believe that such impassioned 
SUbjective judgement is vastly inferior-if indeed it has any claim to legiti-
macy at all-to dispassionate objective judgement. In a situation such as the 
one described above, however, a purely dispassionate or objective perspective 
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would lead to no judgement at all, but rather to a sort of skeptical epoche. 
That is, viewed purely objectively, the occurrence of a highly improbable 
event says nothing about the truth or falsity of the framework within which 
it is viewed as improbable; it neither supports it, nor discredits it, so it fails 
to provide us with a foundation-i.e., an objective foundation-for any judge-
ment whatsoever concerning the status of the framework. 
It is clear, though, that not only do we often make such judgements, we 
appear to be compelled to make them simply by virtue of the kind of creatures 
we are. The difficulty is that there appear to be no fixed guidelines in relation 
to these judgements. But to say that there are no fixed guidelines is not to 
say that there are no guidelines at all. Passion, which has traditionally been 
considered to be in essential opposition to reason, permeates our under-
standing-or attempts to understand-our situation at such points and it is 
this passion, according to Kierkegaard, which serves as a guide to the judge-
ments we make in these situations. 
III 
The metaphysical tradition has been reluctant to appreciate the way in which 
passion informs our understanding of ourselves and the phenomena of our 
experience, hence it is to Polanyi, a chemist turned philosopher-i.e., a meta-
physical interloper-that we must turn for the explicitly formulated observa-
tion that some of the most meaningful of our assertions in science are only 
possible as the result of a collaboration of reason and passion and that these 
assertions will thus always and necessarily "have a passionate quality at-
tached to them."20 
Passion is admittedly not an easy concept to elucidate. Some effort at 
elucidation is necessary, however, because it is precisely passion that, accord-
ing to Kierkegaard, informs the understanding of an individual in such a way 
that extra-framework criteria, or reasons for choosing between competing 
interpretations of existence, may come to exist for him. 
A positive account of the meaning of 'passion' is difficult, if not impossible, 
to provide. An impression of this meaning may be provided, however, if the 
expression is understood to be contrasted with such expressions as 'dispas-
sion' or 'disinterestedness.' Polanyi claims that passion is to be found in our 
"personal participation"21 with the phenomenon whose probability is in ques-
tion. Such participation might be understood to exemplify an essentially 
interested, as opposed to disinterested, relation to this phenomenon. It is just 
such an interested stance which Kierkegaard believes is appropriate with 
respect to the subjective phenomenon of suffering.22 That is, Kierkegaard 
maintains that we have an essential interest in determining or choosing the 
proper interpretation of existence. Our eternal blessedness, or eternal dam-
nation is, according to Kierkegaard, ultimately dependent upon this choice. 
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But if we do not take such an interested stance in relation to the phenomena 
of our subjective experience, then it will never be possible for us to choose 
between various interpretations of existence23-and, in particular, to choose 
the correct one-for the criteria for such choices can only exist for the 
interested observer. It is for this reason that Kierkegaard argues in the Post-
script that Christianity has "nothing whatever to do with the systematic zeal 
of the personally indifferent [my italics] individual," but assumes rather "an 
infinite personal passionate interest [my italics)" on the part of the individual 
as "conditio sine qua non."24 
Thus it becomes clear that the discernment of a discrepancy between the 
aesthetic interpretation of existence, which sees suffering as accidental, and 
the persistence of the suffering which the individual experiences, is the result 
of an impassioned or subjective judgement on the part of that individual. The 
greater the degree of passion with which the consciousness of the individual 
is informed, the less high the degree of the improbability of the suffering 
need be, in order for the individual to seize upon that improbability as 
grounds for rejecting the interpretation of existence within which the particu-
lar account of suffering is contained.25 
Picture the aesthete who experiences persistent suffering, but does not 
despair-i.e., he does not judge that his subjective experience discredits the 
interpretation of existence which views it as improbable. What distinguishes 
such an individual from one who does despair? It would appear that the 
individual who does not despair, fails to do so because he considers the 
phenomena of his existence-or of his subjective experience-objectively, which 
is to say, dispassionately; while the individual who does despair, does so precisely 
because he considers these same phenomena subjectively or passionately. 
It is one thing, however, to observe that a choice between competing inter-
pretations of existence is only possible if one takes a passionate or interested 
stance relative to the phenomena of one's subjective experience, and another 
to argue that such a stance justifies rather than merely explains this choice. 
Passion, for Kierkegaard, is the very essence of human existence. It is well 
known that Kierkegaard proposes that subjectivity is truth,26 but it is not so 
well known that he also proposes that subjectivity is passionY To be dispas-
sionate, or insufficiently passionate, for Kierkegaard, is to be indifferent to 
existence, and this, in turn, amounts to being insufficiently human. It is for 
this reason that Kierkegaard considers the choice of an ethical over an aes-
thetic interpretation of existence to be justified, rather than merely explicable. 
That is, a passionate perspective relative to the phenomena of one's subjective 
experience is the only sort of perspective that is in keeping, on Kierkegaard's 
view, with the essence of the individual. A dispassionate perspective would 
not cohere with that essence. 
Thus passion emerges as the catalyst of the exchange of one perspective 
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of existence for another. That is, passion breaks down the apparent coherence 
or descriptive adequacy of a particular interpretation of existence. Unless the 
consciousness of the individual is informed with a sufficient degree of pas-
sion, the persistence of his or her suffering cannot serve as a criterion for 
rejecting the aesthetic in favor of the ethical interpretation of existence. 
It is, of course, possible to be too passionate. If the consciousness of the 
individual is informed with too much passion, the resultant interpretation of 
existence may cross over into the pathological. Such a phenomenon is actu-
ally addressed by Kierkegaard and referred to by him in the Postscript as 
subjective madness (subjektive Galskab).28 It is important to note, however, 
that it is not possible to formalize the precise degree of passion which is 
sufficient to break down the aesthetic interpretation of existence so that the 
choice of another interpretation becomes possible, and yet not so great as to 
qualify the individual as pathological. It is precisely this resistance of passion, 
or of an understanding which is informed with passion, to such formalization 
that serves as a stumbling block to metaphysics. But this is simply our situ-
ation as human beings and part of the task of philosophy is to help us to 
achieve a more profound understanding of that situation. 
IV 
I have restricted my explication of the nature of the transition from one stage 
of existence to another to the transition from the aesthetic to the ethical stage. 
I have done this because this was the transition that MacIntyre examined and 
which he used in an effort to support his charge that Kierkegaard was an 
irrationalist. It should be clear now that Kierkegaard's own interpretation of 
the nature of this transition will not support MacIntyre's charge. Opponents 
of the view I am propounding might argue, however, that while it appears 
possible to consider the choice between any of the non-Christian interpreta-
tions as rational, the same thing cannot be said concerning the choice to adopt 
a Christian framework. It is tempting to interpret Kierkegaard such that it 
appears the transition to the Christian stage of existence is the result of a 
choice for which there can be no criterion. 
We can see, however, from the quotation below, that there is a criterion for 
choosing the Christian interpretation; this criterion is precisely the phenome-
non of the consciousness of sin. That is, Kierkegaard contends that 
Christianity is only related to the consciousness of sin. Any other attempt to 
become a Christian for any other reason is quite literally lunacy; and that is 
how it should be.29 
Just as the ethical interpretation of existence provided a more adequate 
account of human suffering to the aesthete whose consciousness was in-
formed with a sufficient degree of passion, so does the Christian interpreta-
tion provide a more adequate account of the subjective experience of the 
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individual whose consciousness is informed with an even greater degree of 
passion. 
Such passion arises, again, from an interested stance toward the question 
of which of the possible interpretations of existence is correct. The more 
extreme the interpretation presented to the individual, the more passionate-
as opposed to dispassionate-must his or her self examination be. That is, 
when an individual is presented with an interpretation of existence such as 
that offered by Christianity, an interpretation which makes his or her eternal 
blessedness or eternal damnation dependent upon its acceptance, then the 
proper response is not a casual concern as to the truth of this interpretation, 
but rather a deep and impassioned introspection in which the individual 
repeatedly asks himself: "Could this be the real nature of my existence?" 
"Does this interpretation of my existence make the most sense-i.e., more 
sense than any other interpretation-of my subjective experience?"30 
v 
With this we have a simple model of Kierkegaard's theory concerning the 
nature of human rationality. We must distinguish, however, what is essential 
to Kierkegaard's position as he understood it, and what is essential for the 
purposes of defending Kierkegaard against the charge of irrationalism as that 
charge was leveled against him by MacIntyre. It is important to appreciate 
that Kierkegaard's own understanding of the position described above in-
volved a foundation of religious belief which is separable from the position 
itself. Kierkegaard would no more consider the persistence of an individual 
who has the good luck not to suffer in an aesthetic interpretation to be 
justified than we would consider the racism of an ignorant person to be 
justified. That is, just as we would consider that an ignorant person should 
know better than to be racist, Kierkegaard would consider that a fortunate 
person should know better than to persist in an aesthetic interpretation of 
existence. 
Existence, for Kierkegaard, is characterized by sin and part of the way in 
which sin manifests itself is in the inability of the individual to sustain 
emotional equilibrium in the face of misfortune or adversity. It is this inability 
which accounts for the suffering in question. The difficulty is that this inabil-
ity itself stems from an excessive attachment to worldly pleasure or comfort.J1 
As long as the existence of an individual is characterized by such attachment, 
suffering is still present in it, in potentia. Hence, while suffering justifies the 
choice of an ethical over an aesthetic interpretation of existence, on 
Kierkegaard's view, the absence of suffering does not have the same signifi-
cance. The absence of suffering does not justify the endorsement of an aes-
thetic view of existence because suffering is always present in the existence 
of an individual in potentia, so to speak, in the form of sin. Any individual 
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who is sufficiently reflective to appreciate the tenuous nature of happiness 
on the aesthetic interpretation, would find his or her existence, no matter how 
"fortunate," characterized by an anxiety or fear of potential adversity which 
would itself constitute a kind of suffering. The only way to avoid such anxi-
ety, on Kierkegaard's view, would be to avoid reflection. 
We may argue that different levels of reflection are natural for different 
sorts of people and that it is even possible for certain individuals to live lives 
almost entirely devoid of reflection. Kierkegaard's religious convictions com-
pel him to assume, however, that the activity of reflection is universally 
human and that whatever differences there may be in the degree of reflection 
which characterize various individuals, even the least reflective individual 
can only avoid recognizing the tenuous nature of happiness on the aesthetic 
view of existence by willfully refusing to reflect upon the significance of this 
view. And this willful refusal, on Kierkegaard's view, constitutes, in turn, a 
flight from the acknowledgement of oneself as sinful. 
It is not necessary, however, that one share Kierkegaard's religious views 
in order to appreciate the force of his claim concerning the possibility of 
extra-framework criteria for choosing between competing interpretations of 
existence. If this were necessary, then the charge of irrationalism could still 
be leveled against him. That is, the support for his position would ultimately 
rest upon a foundation of dogma that could not itself be chosen for any reason, 
for it would only be relative to this foundation that reasons for such choices 
could exist. 
One of the most important aspects of Kierkegaard's position is that expe-
rience is distinguished from the various interpretations which may be sup-
plied to it. The medium of experience, according to Kierkegaard, is actuality, 
while the medium of such interpretations is ideality. That is, the interpreta-
tions represent clusters of concepts (hence the origin of the appellation "con-
ceptual framework") and the medium of concepts is abstract, in contrast to 
the medium of experience, which is concrete. 32 
We can keep the view that subjective experience, insofar as it is actual, 
may be distinguished from a particular conceptual framework or ideal inter-
pretation that is supplied to it and the claim that this experience can provide 
criteria for choosing between such frameworks, without having to accept the 
view that experience, properly defined, will always incline one toward a 
particular interpretation of existence. This is what one might refer to as the 
theoretical skeleton of Kierkegaard's view of rationality as it appears when 
stripped of the religious assumptions which gave the view its more specific 
definition in Kierkegaard's works.33 
Taylor's contention that the transition from one interpretation of existence to 
another is effected through a move of error reduction is consistent with much 
of what Kierkegaard says concerning such transitions. On Kierkegaard's 
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view, one rejects the aesthetic framework in favor of an ethical one precisely 
because a passionate interpretation of the persistence of one's suffering leads 
one to consider that there is an error in the aesthetic framework-the "error" 
in question being the view that suffering is of merely accidental significance 
or the result of misfortune. The difference between Taylor and Kierkegaard 
is that on Kierkegaard's account, the errors are not inconsistencies within a 
particular framework-for as we have seen, the persistence of suffering is 
not, objectively, inconsistent with the interpretation of existence which views 
such persistence as improbable-but are errors relative to the individual's 
subjective or impassioned experience. 
One could express Kierkegaard's views in secular terms by substituting for 
"guilt consciousness" or "[t]he anguished conscience" what Taylor has iden-
tified as a "need for meaning."34 Taylor contends that individuals are faced 
today with the problem of attempting to imbue their existence with some 
significance that goes beyond the expression and fulfillment-or lack 
thereof-of their daily needs. 
Thus if one is more comfortable with the expression 'need for meaning' 
than with Kierkegaard's overtly religious expression like 'guilt conscious-
ness,' an individual could be understood as adopting a particular framework 
because he perceived that that framework promised to imbue his existence 
with the meaning of which he felt a lack. In this wayan ethical interpretation 
of existence could be seen as supplying meaning to the suffering of an indi-
vidual that the aesthetic interpretation was unable to supply.35 
Concluding Comments 
It should now be clear that the charge of irrationalism leveled against 
Kierkegaard by MacIntyre is based upon a misunderstanding of the relation 
between the aesthetic and the ethical interpretations of existence on 
Kierkegaard's view. Not only is Kierkegaard's philosophy not irrationalist in 
the way in which MacIntyre and others have claimed, his conception of the 
nature of human rationality is one which can be of great help in relation to 
the contemporary debate on the nature of human rationality. The view that 
"rational" decisions need not always be the result of purely objective or 
dispassionate speculation and that hence emotional or non-rational phenom-
ena may serve as criteria for such choices is clearly one which would be of 
use to contemporary theorists. 
Kierkegaard's interpretation of human rationality provides us with a posi-
tive alternative to the traditional conception of reason as disinterested and 
dispassionate. But it is not simply an alternative to this more traditional 
conception. It is an alternative with an advantage. That is, it provides us with 
a way to get beyond the impasse at which the contemporary debate on this 
issue has arrived, by reminding us that there are some areas of inquiry where 
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"an objective indifference can .. .learn nothing at all,"36 or as Nagel expressed 
it in The View From Nowhere, where "the truth is not to be found by traveling 
as far away from one's personal perspective as possible,"37 and hence where 
being "rational" means taking a passionate or interested stance in relation to 
the phenomena in question. 
Kierkegaard's view of rationality possesses a further advantage over the 
traditional view in that it provides us with a more descriptively adequate 
account of our understanding of ourselves and of the phenomena of our 
subjective experience. That is, it does not preclude the possibility that our 
movement from one interpretation of existence to another may take place as 
a natural or evolutionary development rather than as the result of a choice, 
but it also allows us to make sense of the experience, that we at least occa-
sionally have, that we choose to adopt a particular interpretation of existence, 
that there are good reasons for adopting this interpretation and that we choose 
to adopt it for those reasons and not simply as a matter of pure caprice. 
What we have in Kierkegaard's picture of the role of passion in reason is 
a more "reasonable" picture of reason than the one that has been offered to 
us by the metaphysical tradition. It is a picture of reason that involves a 
positive incorporation of what we essentially are, subjects situated in and 
passionately engaged with the flux which constitutes our temporal existence. 
Finally, it is a picture that allows us to justify rationally the weight that we 
seem compelled, simply by virtue of the kind of creatures we are, to attribute 
to our subjective experience. 
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